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Abstract—Allocation of spectrum is an important policy issue
and decisions taken have ramifications for future growth of
wireless communications and achieving universal connectivity. In
this paper, on a common footing we compare the social welfare
obtained from the allocation of new spectrum under different
alternatives: to licensed providers in monopolistic, oligopolistic
and perfectly competitive settings, and for unlicensed access.
For this purpose we use mathematical models of competition
in congestible resources. Initially we assume that any new
bandwidth is available for free, but we also generalize our results
to include investment decisions when prices are charged for
bandwidth acquisition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum allocation and its impact on commercial wireless
mobile broadband as well as the goal of universal electronic
connectivity has been a topic of great interest in recent years.
A large driver for this has been the take-up and usage of
mobile telephony and wireless-data-capable devices. This has
lead to increased demand from the wireless service providers
for spectrum [29], [31], [32]. At the same time there have been
many scientific articles [30] on current spectrum usage and the
impact of policy decisions on the current wireless broadband
environment [15], [17], [28]. The issues and concerns raised
have lead to further policy discussions [18], [22] on freeing
up more spectrum and also on the means of providing this for
the purposes of wireless broadband access. One proposal has
been to auction the freed up spectrum to commercial wireless
service providers [20]. Another proposal that builds on the
success of open-access strategy [33], [34] of 802.11/WiFi [27]
for the 2.4 GHz and 5GHz bands, is to provision [16], [21]
the new spectrum also for open/unlicensed access, also known
as spectrum commons. A step along this direction has already
been taken by the FCC for the TV white-space [19]. In the
rest of the document we will use commons, white-space, open-
access and unlicensed access interchangeably.
There has been considerable debate on these different spec-
trum allocation proposals [15], [17], [21], [28], [35], [36], both
on technical issues and on their impact on social welfare. It has
been argued in [15], [17] that following Coase’s theorem [10],
[11], the best approach is to properly define the property
rights of owing spectrum so that commercial entities can then
trade purchased (or allocated) spectrum among each other
in order to achieve a socially optimal or efficient outcome.
On the contrary, arguing that the open-access philosophy of
802.11/WiFi spurred multiple innovations in wireless tech-
nologies and devices leading to greater social welfare over
time, [21], [28], [33], [34] have advocated for a large un-
licensed access component of any new release of spectrum.
The work in [35], [36] advocated caution in adopting the
commons paradigm with the prevalent spectrum allocations.
They analyzed markets where unlicensed spectrum coexists
with licensed spectrum and showed the both social welfare
and consumer welfare could decrease when new spectrum is
added as unlicensed spectrum.
The purpose of this article is to consider a simple analytic
model where the different options of allocating bandwidth
described above can be compared in quantitative terms while
taking into account existing bandwidth allocations and market
structures in terms of commercial providers and unlicensed
access. In particular, we would like to compare the following
market scenarios in terms of their impact on total social
welfare and consumer surplus when additional bandwidth
is provisioned: monopoly, monopoly with unlicensed access,
oligopoly, oligopoly with unlicensed access, perfect competi-
tion (where a large number of providers is considered) and per-
fect competition with unlicensed access. Initially, we develop
our results assuming that the additional bandwidth is available
free of charge. However, we then use these results to the setting
where commercial entities have to purchase bandwidth. As a
consequence, we propose per unit price valuations than can be
used to compare different market scenarios.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we describe
the model of competition in congestible resources that we use
for all our results, also set-up the require notation. Section III
is devoted to characterizing the equilibria when the capacity is
assumed to be given free of charge. In Section IV, we use the
results developed in Section III to include investment decisions
by the providers when they have to pay to obtain spectrum.
We numerically explore the consequences of our results in
Section V, and conclude in Section VI.
II. MODEL
We use the model of competition in congestible re-
sources [1]–[7], [12]–[14], [35]–[37] built upon the use of the
Wardrop equilibrium [8], [9]. The main tenet is that impact of
power-sharing and interference constraints in wireless systems
on the achieved quality of service is conceptualized as latency
prices that get added to any service price for the consumers.
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2In addition, when faced with alternatives for access/usage,
the users differentiate based on total delivered price, which
is the sum of access price and latency price, and choose
to use only those that have the lowest price; this is the
Wardrop equilibrium [8] condition. In the mathematical model,
users are assumed to be atomic, i.e., a mass of consumers
in [0, qmax], and have a concave decreasing demand-to-price
function P (q) : [0, qmax] 7→ [0, pmax] for quantity q, with
inverse Q(p) : [0, pmax] 7→ [0, qmax] for price p; note that
Q(p) is also decreasing but convex. The wireless systems are
assumed to have a latency function for spectrum usage level
q given by l(q/C) that is convex increasing with l(0) = 0,
where C is the provisioned capacity. For a usage level of
q, provisioned capacity C and asking price p, the delivered
price is p + l(q/C) and consumers compare different access
possibilities using this delivered price.
Since we’re comparing different types of systems, we will
index the quantity/demand served q, the prices assessed p,
the capacities provisioned and the latency functions as fol-
lows: by sub-script m if a monopoly, 1 and 2 to indicate
competitive providers for the oligopolistic scenario, w for
white-space/open-access, and c for perfect competition (i.e.,
atomic service providers); for the oligopolistic scenario we
will also denote the capacities by the appropriate indices. The
capacity allocated to white-space/open-access will be denoted
by W , and following the results of [35], [36], we will assume
that the price assessed for whitespace/open-access is 0 so
that any service providers operating in these bands will not
earn any revenue for users served; note that there will still
be the latency charge based on usage level which the users
will perceive and react to. In general, we will assume that
P (·), l(·) and D(·) are all twice continuously differentiable.
Many of our results and calculations will be for linear latency
functions and demand functions, i.e., we will set l(x) = x,
P (q) = pmax(1 − q) (assuming qmax = 1 without loss of
generality) and D(p) = 1 − p/pmax. In many cases we will
make the simplifying assumption that the latency function for
all the entities involved is the same, i.e., some function f(·).
For further details, we refer the readers to [2], [4], [6], [7],
[35]–[37], and also to [38].
III. EQUILIBRIA GIVEN INITIAL ENDOWMENTS
We start by considering a monopoly provider setting. Here
the provider sets a price for access and the user population
demand is determined by the total delivered price, i.e., the
sum of the access price and the latency price. In this setting,
the optimal price for the monopolist is one that maximizes
her revenue. Under the assumptions of our model, the revenue
optimal price is unique. Furthermore, adding additional band-
width to the monopolist’s portfolio results in an increase in
total welfare. These results are summarized below.
Proposition 1: With a monopoly service provider, the rev-
enue maximization problem is a convex optimization problem
where the user equilibrium demand satisfies the following
fixed point equation
q∗m = −
P (q∗m)− lm
(
q∗m
C
)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
(1)
with a unique solution in [0, qmax]. Given the user equilibrium
demand, the change in total welfare with additional capacity
allocated to the monopolist is non-negative and given by
∂Tm(q
∗
m)
∂C
= −q∗mP ′(q∗m)
∂q∗m
∂C
+ q∗m
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C2
. (2)
Proof: See Appendix A.
With a linear latency function and a linear demand to price
function, the user equilibrium demand, the monopolist price,
the revenue, consumer surplus and change in total welfare with
additional capacity are explicitly given by
q∗m =
1
2
Cpmax
1 + Cpmax
, Sm(q
∗
m) =
pmax
8
(
Cpmax
1 + Cpmax
)2
,
p∗m =
pmax
2
, Rm(q
∗
m) =
pmax
4
Cpmax
1 + Cpmax
,
∂Tm(q
∗
m)
∂C
=
pmax
4(1 + Cpmax)2
(
1 +
Cpmax
1 + Cpmax
)
.
Next we consider a scenario where the monopolist provider
has to compete with an open-access band. We add W capacity
as whitespace and consider the impact of this. We again
define qc to be the quantity served in the proprietary spectrum
and set qw to be the quantity served in the whitespace. As
mentioned before, we will sometimes make the simplifying
assumption that lm(qm/C) = f(qm/C) and the latency cost
in the whitespace lw(qw/W ) = f(qw/W ) where f(·) is
an increasing convex function with domain being the non-
negative reals.
We start by assuming that there is no proprietary spectrum.
Then quantity served in the whitespace is given by the unique
solution to
lw
(qw
W
)
= P (qw).
Denote the solution by qˆw. Note that if the proprietary provider
sets an asking price greater than P (qˆw), then no traffic
arrives, and such a strategy will not be adopted as a revenue
maximizing solution. For an asking price less than P (qˆw),
there will be some traffic to the proprietary provider’s spectrum
such that a user equilibrium is achieved, i.e., the delivered
price from both spectrum sources will be the same so that
users are indifferent; that the asking price is less than P (qˆw)
will be a standing assumption in the rest of this document.
This then implies that
p+ lm
(qm
C
)
= lw
(qw
W
)
= P (qm + qw).
3The revenue of the proprietary provider, consumer surplus and
total welfare are then given by
Rmw(p, qm, qw) = pqm
Smw(p, qm, qw) =
∫ qm+qw
0
P (q)dq − (qm + qw)P (qm + qw)
Tmw(p, qm, qw) =
∫ qm+qw
0
P (q)dq − qmlm
(qm
C
)
− qwlw
(qw
W
)
where we have used the user equilibrium relationships to
derive the alternate expressions. We use the subscript “mw”
to denote the monopoly with whitespace scenario.
From the user equilibrium we get
qm = D
(
lw
(qw
W
))
− qw
p = lw
(qw
W
)
− lm
(
D
(
lw
(
qw
W
))− qw
C
)
.
The above relationship explicitly characterizes the fact that
there is only one degree of freedom. For ease of analysis we
will consider qw to be the degree of freedom. Constraining
the range of p to be [0, P (qˆw)] implies a similar constraint on
qw (and qm). One bound on qw is qˆw. The second is given by
the case when p = 0 where we have
lm
(qm
C
)
= lw
(qw
W
)
= P (qm + qw).
There it is easy to see that solutions are q˜w and q˜m =
C l−1m (lw(q˜W /W )) where q˜w is the unique solution to
lw
(qw
W
)
= P
(
qw + C l
−1
m
(
lw
(
q˜W
W
)))
It is easy to see that q˜w < qˆw so that the allowed values of
qw ∈ [q˜w, qˆw]. With these definitions, the revenue maximiza-
tion problem is given by
max
qw∈[q˜w,qˆw]
Rmw(p, qc, qw) = pqm
In [35], [36] the authors showed for box demand functions
and linear latency functions that the total welfare can decrease
upon the introduction of white-space. This reduction in total
welfare with the addition of a small amount of white-space is
even more general. For general latency functions and general
demand versus price functions, we have the following result.
Theorem 1: Let q∗m and p
∗
m be the user equilibrium demand
and the revenue maximizing price in the monopoly setting.
Using these define
qˆw = l
−1
w
(
p∗m + lm
(
q∗m
C
))
= l−1w (P (q
∗
m))
to obtain the marginal demand served in the white-space. Then
the change of total welfare with the addition of a small amount
of white-space is given by
∂Tmw
∂W
∣∣∣
W=0
=
1
2
(
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
)
P ′(q∗m) + q
∗
mqˆwP
′′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + q
∗
m
P ′′(q∗m)
2
q∗mP
′(q∗m).
(3)
The marginal change in total welfare with the addition of a
small amount of white-space is negative when either qˆw +
q∗m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
≥ 0 or the latency functions are linear.
Proof: See Appendix B.
When the demand functions are linear and lm(x) = lw(x) =
x, the revenue maximization problem is a convex optimization
problem with a unique solution; we omit the details as the
analysis is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. In this case the
user equilibrium demands, the monopolist price, the optimal
revenue, consumer surplus and the change in total welfare with
additional capacity are explicitly given by
q∗w =
Cpmax
2 +Wpmax + 1
Cpmax +Wpmax + 1
Wpmax
Wpmax + 1
,
q∗m =
1
2
Cpmax
Cpmax +Wpmax + 1
, p∗m =
pmax
2
1
1 +Wpmax
,
Rmw(q
∗
w) =
pmax
4
Cpmax
Cpmax +Wpmax + 1
1
1 +Wpmax
,
Smw(q
∗
w) =
pmax
2
(
Wpmax + Cpmax − Cpmax2(1+Wpmax)
Cpmax +Wpmax + 1
)2
,
∂Tmw(q
∗
w)
∂W
∣∣∣
W=0
= −p
2
max
4
C2p2max
(1 + Cpmax)3
,
We will be using this to compare across the different market
types.
Next we consider a competitive setting with two providers.
We will use the results of this scenario to determine the impact
of creating a competitor by assigning the new bandwidth to a
different entity. In the two providers competitive environment,
the work in [35], [36] observed that allocating the additional
spectrum as licensed provides higher social value with box
demand functions and linear latency functions. In order to
compare across market types in a uniform manner and to
obtain explicit expressions, we will, however, consider linear
latencies and linear demand versus price functions; we will
also assume that the latency functions are the same for both
providers. The existence of equilibria can be proved under
more general conditions following the approach in [2], [4],
[7]. We let provider i have capacity Ci and revenue Ri where
i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that we have a game formulation between
the two providers that is based upon the user equilibrium for
prices chosen by the providers. The resulting sub-game perfect
equilibrium is summarized below.
Proposition 2: The oligopoly model of spectrum access
admits a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. The unique
sub-game perfect equilibrium of prices set by competitor
i = 1, 2 is given by
p∗i = pmax
p2max +
pmax
Ci
+ 2pmaxC−i +
2
C1C2
3p2max + 4pmax
(
1
C1
+ 1C2
)
+ 4C1C2
(4)
The corresponding user equilibrium demands for i = 1, 2 are
q∗i =
p2max + 2
pmax
C−i
3p2max + 4pmax
(
1
C1
+ 1C2
)
+ 4C1C2
(5)
4Proof: See Appendix C.
Using the expressions in (4) and (5), the revenues of the
providers, the consumer surplus and the total surplus are given
by
R1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = p
∗
1q
∗
1 , R2(p
∗
2, p
∗
1) = p
∗
2q
∗
2 ,
So(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) =
pmax
2
(q∗1 + q
∗
2)
2,
To(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = R1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) +R2(p
∗
2, p
∗
1) + So(p
∗
1, p
∗
2).
We use the subscript “o” to denote oligopolistic competition.
Next consider the scenario of two competitors with white-
space; again assume that the latency function is the same
for white-space. We can extend the result of Proposition 2
to the following characterization of the sub-game perfect
equilibrium. Define D to be the following quantity
D := 3p2max + 4pmax
(
1
C1
+
1
C2
)
+ 4Wp2max
(
2 + 2pmax +
1
C1
+
1
C2
)
+ 4
2∏
i=1
(
1
Ci
+Wpmax
(
1 + pmax +
1
Ci
)) (6)
Proposition 3: The oligopoly model of spectrum access
with additional open-access admits a unique sub-game per-
fect equilibrium. The unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of
prices set by competitor i = 1, 2 is given by
p∗i
pmax
=
(
2Wpmax +Wp
2
max + (1 +Wpmax)
(
pmax +
1
Ci
))
×
(
2Wpmax +Wp
2
max + (1 +Wpmax)
(
pmax +
2
C−i
))
(1 +Wpmax)D
(7)
The user equilibrium demands are given by
∀i = 1, 2 q∗i =
2pmaxC−i + p
2
max + 2Wp
2
max
(
1 + pmax +
1
C−i
)
D
q∗w =
Wpmax
1 +Wpmax
×
∏2
i=1
(
pmax +
2
Ci
+ 2Wpmax
(
1 + pmax +
1
Ci
))
D
(8)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The revenues of the providers, the consumer surplus and the
total surplus are given by
R1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) = p
∗
1q
∗
1 , R2(q
∗
2 , q
∗
1) = p
∗
2q
∗
2 ,
Sow(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) =
pmax
2
(q∗1 + q
∗
2 + q
∗
w)
2,
Tow(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) = R1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) +R2(q
∗
2 , q
∗
1) + Sow(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2).
(9)
Here we use the subscript “ow” to denote the oligopolistic
competition with whitespace scenario.
Now consider perfect competition, i.e., the limiting regime
of infinitely many providers. The applicability of the atomic
providers model of perfect competition can be formally justi-
fied as a limit of (symmetric) Nash equilibria of the symmetric
finite provider model (sub-case of the model in Prop. 2 when
there are two providers) as the number of providers increases
without bound; the details can be found in Appendix G,
also see [37] for a similar limiting analysis. Without loss of
generality, we assume a unit mass of providers. For a provider
at [x, x + dx] with x ∈ [0, 1], we denote the capacity to
be C(x), the price to be p(x) and the traffic served to be
qc(x). We assume that C(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1] and
C =
∫ 1
0
C(x)dx. Then the user equilibrium is given by
p(x) + lc
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
= P
(∫ 1
0
qc(y)dy
)
=: λ ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
(10)
The revenue of a provider at [x, x+ dx] is given by
Rc(x) = p(x)qc(x) = qc(x)
(
λ− lc
(
qc(x)
C(x)
))
.
Since the provider at [x, x + dx] has no market power, we
will assume that her price choice cannot change λ. For this
scenario, we get the following result.
Theorem 2: At the equilibrium between the providers, the
user equilibrium is given by qc(x)C(x) ≡ α¯ (independent of x ∈
[0, 1]) where α¯ is given by the unique solution in [0, 1/C] of
P (αC) = lc(α) + αl
′
c(α) (11)
The optimal price is independent of x and is given by
pc(x) =
qc(x)
C(x)
l′c
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
≡ α¯l′c(α¯). (12)
The marginal increase in total welfare with bandwidth alloca-
tion is given by
∂Tc
∂C
= α¯2l′c(α¯). (13)
Furthermore, the price chosen is such that the total welfare is
also maximized, so that efficiency results.
Proof: See Appendix E.
The total revenue of all the providers, the total welfare and
the consumer surplus are given by
Rc =
∫ x
0
Rc(x)dx = α¯
2l′c(α¯)C, T =
∫ α¯C
0
P (q)dq − α¯lc(α¯)C,
Sc =
∫ α¯C
0
P (q)dq − α¯lc(α¯)C − α¯2l′c(α¯)C.
5When both the latency function and the demand function are
linear, these simplify to
α¯ =
1
C + 2pmax
, α¯C =
Cpmax
Cpmax + 2
,
∂Tc
∂C
=
1
(C + 2pmax )
2
,
Rc =
C(
C + 2pmax
)2 , Sc = pmax2
(
C
C + 2pmax
)2
,
Tc =
C(
C + 2pmax
)2 + pmax2
(
C
C + 2pmax
)2
.
(14)
We now generalize the perfect competition model by adding
W bandwidth as whitespace.
Proposition 4: At the equilibrium between the providers,
the user equilibrium is given by qc(x)C(x) ≡ αw and
q∗w = Q
(
αwl
′
c(αw) + lc(αw)
)− αwC,
where αw is the unique solution in [0, α¯] of
lw
(
Q
(
αl′c(α) + lc(α)
)− αC
W
)
= αl′c(α) + lc(α).
The optimal price is given by p(x) ≡ αwl′c(αw).
Proof: See Appendix F.
The total revenue of the providers, consumer surplus and total
welfare are given by
Rcw = α
2
wl
′
w(αw)C
Scw =
∫ αwC+q∗w
0
P (q)dq − (αwl′c(αw) + lc(αw))(αwC + q∗w)
Tcw =
∫ αwC+q∗w
0
P (q)dq − (αwl′c(αw) + lc(αw))q∗w − lc(αw)αwC
In the linear latencies and linear demand case, the expressions
simplify to
αw =
1
C + 2W + 2pmax
, αwC =
C
C + 2W + 2pmax
,
q∗w =
2W
C + 2W + 2pmax
,
∂Tcw
∂W
=
8W(
C + 2W + 2pmax
)3 ,
Rcw =
C(
C + 2W + 2pmax
)2 , Scw = pmax2
(
C + 2W
C + 2W + 2pmax
)2
,
Tcw =
C(
C + 2W + 2pmax
)2 + pmax2
(
C + 2W
C + 2W + 2pmax
)2
,
∂Tcw
∂C
=
C + 6W + 2pmax(
C + 2W + 2pmax
)3 .
Note that ∂Tcw∂W
∣∣
W=0
= 0 in this case which contrasts with all
other scenarios where a small amount of bandwidth is added
as whitespace.
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENT COST
In the analysis thus far, we have assumed that the extra spec-
trum is available to the monopolist free of cost. However, in
reality, this spectrum would have to be purchased from another
owner or from the government. We assume that the entity with
spectrum resources is willing to assign Ce units of bandwidth
at a per unit price of pe; the label e is short-form for extra.
We are mainly concerned with the case when the monopolist
has an initial bandwidth endowment of C > 0. However, we
will also discuss the case when C = 0. For simplicity we
will analyze the all-linear setting, but in future work we will
consider the more general setting in terms of demand and
latency functions too. Since any purchase of spectrum counts
against net revenue, we will use the characterization of optimal
revenue based on the user equilibrium behavior characterized
in Section III.
The problem faced by the monopolist now is to maximize
his net revenue, i.e., revenue obtained from the users minus
the cost for the additional bandwidth. This is given by
max
c∈[0,Ce]
Rm(q
∗
m(C + c))− pec
From our earlier expressions, this is a convex optimization
problem. The derivative of the objective function is given by
pmax
4
1
((C + c)pmax + 1)
2 − pe.
Therefore, the optimal purchase is given by
c∗m = min
([
1
2
√
pe
− 1
pmax
− C
]
+
, Ce
)
.
Using this, the maximum per unit price at which a monopolist
will buy all the available spectrum, that is, the market clearing
price, is given by
pme =
p2max
4 ((C + Ce)pmax + 1)
2 .
We will use this for our comparisons. Note that this price can
be used as a reference for the value of extra spectrum to the
monopolist.
We now extend the analysis of this setting to consider
the possibility of the monopolist buying extra spectrum. The
monopolist once again maximizes her net revenue, but subject
to her initial endowment of C bandwidth units and with
W units of bandwidth used as whitespace. The optimization
problem is given by
max
c∈[0,Ce]
Rm(q
∗
w)− pec
This is a simple extension of the previous analysis, and the
optimal purchase is given by
c∗w = min
([
1
2
√
pe
− 1
pmax
− C −W
]
+
, Ce
)
.
6Using this maximum per unit price at which a monopolist will
buy all the available spectrum is given by
pmwe =
p2max
4 ((C + Ce +W )pmax + 1)
2 .
Note that for the purposes of buying new spectrum, the
monopolist behaves as if the W units of whitespace bandwidth
are also part of her initial endowment.
Next we analyze the impact of investment cost of addi-
tional spectrum on competing service providers. Owing to
competition, we will have a game formulation the equilibrium
of which will yield the capacity investment choices. The
timing of the game is as follows: the spectrum owner (say
the government or some other such entity) releases up to Cie
units of bandwidth at unit price pie for i = 1, 2 to the two
service providers; the service providers decide on the amount
of spectrum to purchase cie for i = 1, 2 with Ci being their
initial endowments; then they set prices and the users choose
their access levels based upon the delivered price. Note that
we allow for differential pricing. Building upon the results in
Proposition 2, we seek a sub-game perfect equilibrium, and in
particular, pure-strategy equilibria.
We start by analyzing the revenue of the providers as a
function of their capacity.
Lemma 1: The revenue of provider i = 1, 2 at the Nash
equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2 is a strictly concave
function of her capacity Ci.
Proof: See Appendix H.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, given the capacity of provider
−i, the equilibrium prices, and the equilibrium user access
levels, the best-response of provider i is the (unique) solution
of a convex optimization problem with a strictly concave
objective function (the net revenue). Therefore, we obtain
the following result characterizing the existence of a Nash
equilibrium spectrum purchase strategy.
Theorem 3: The spectrum investment game is a concave
game, so a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof: The concave game property follows from
Lemma 1, and then the result follows from standard existence
theorems in [24, Theorem 1], and [25], [26].
Since pure-strategy equilibria exist, the next quantities of in-
terest are values of the prices (p1e, p
2
e) such that at equilibrium
the service providers buy the allocated capacities (C1e , C
2
e ).
The social planner can then decide the best allocation of ca-
pacities (subject to available spectrum) to maximize the social
welfare, which is the sum of the consumer surplus and the
providers’ revenues1. From the best-response characterization,
it follows that if the social planner chooses the prices to be
p¯ie =
∂Ri
∂Ci
when the capacity allocation of the provider i is
given by Ci + Cie, then the equilibrium purchase of provider
i is, indeed, Cie. From Lemma 1 we get that prices that the
1Note that the investment cost term cancels in the social welfare calculation.
social planner should choose for i = 1, 2 are given by
p¯ie = p
3
max
×
(
pmax +
2
C−i+C−ie
)2
((
3p2max +
4pmax
C−i+C−ie
)
(Ci + Cie) + 4pmax +
4
C−i+C−ie
)
×
(
7pmax +
8
C−i+C−ie
) (
Ci + C
i
e
)
+
4pmax+
4
C−i+C−ie
3pmax+
4
C−i+C−ie((
3p2max +
4pmax
C−i+C−ie
)
(Ci + Cie) + 4pmax +
4
C−i+C−ie
)2 .
Using the same analysis procedure as in the competitive
setting, we can show that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists
when there some bandwidth set-aside as whitespace, and we
can also determine the unit price of spectrum at which the
providers purchase the entirety of the allocated spectrum. In
the interest of brevity, we omit the details.
For the perfect competition case, we conjecture that any
additional spectrum should be handed out free of charge,
and for simplicity, proportional to the initial endowment. We
believe that many other spectrum allocation mechanisms will
yield the same social welfare. Proving this conjecture is for
future work.
V. DISCUSSION
The value of the results in Section III is in providing
comparative statics for the different market scenarios being
considered for new spectrum. The contribution of Section IV is
in proposing appropriate per unit valuations for any additional
spectrum based on the different market scenarios. For all our
numerical results, we will always assume that the latency
function is linear and same for every player (provider or
whitespace). We will also assume a linear demand function
on the user side with with qmax = 1 and pmax = 1.
For the first set of results, we will assume that we have
initial allocated bandwidth of 1 unit. Here we explore the total
welfare achieved under the different market types when an
additional bandwidth of up to 2 units is allocated. The total
welfare as a function of the additional bandwidth is shown in
Figure 1. The different curves correspond to the results in Sec-
tion III and cover the cases of monopoly provider, monopoly
provider with extra bandwidth only as open access, oligopolis-
tic providers with with an initial endowment of 1/2 units of
capacity and the extra capacity allocated equally, oligopolistic
providers with an initial endowment of 1/2 units of capacity
competing with extra bandwidth only as open access, perfectly
competitive market (with C(x) ≡ 1,∀x ∈ [0, 1]) and perfectly
competitive market (∀x ∈ [0, 1], C(x) ≡ 1) with additional
bandwidth only as open-access. For these settings, we will be
using the expressions obtained for linear latency and demand
functions in Section III.
Some salient features of the curves in Figure 1 are the
following. Adding a small amount of additional bandwidth
only as open-access results in a decrease in total welfare
for both the monopolistic and oligopolistic settings, and here
it would be better to allocate the bandwidth to the service
7providers. With a sufficiently large bandwidth allocation, the
total welfare is actually better when allocating the spectrum
as unlicensed access when there is a monopoly provider. In
the perfectly competitive setting, adding additional bandwidth
only as open-access leads to a much slower increase in total
welfare, nevertheless, the total welfare does increase. Within
the settings of our model, it is better to allocate all the
bandwidth to the service providers instead of setting it aside
as whitespace, even in the oligopolistic setting. A final point is
that having even two competing providers brings the outcome
much closer to the efficient outcome seen in the perfectly
competitive situation.
Fig. 1: Total welfare as a function of bandwidth allocated
according to the different schemes for a particular choice of
linear latencies and demand function
Next we consider case where there is a monopolist with an
initial capacity endowment of C = 1. From Figure 1, we know
that allocating a small amount of bandwidth as whitespace
reduces the total welfare and only when a significantly large
amount of bandwidth is allocated as whitespace, is the total
welfare better than allocating it to the monopolist. However,
this bandwidth can be allocated to a new service provider who
will compete with the incumbent. In Figure 2, we compare the
total welfare obtained by allocating all the new bandwidth
to a new competitor with allocating it to the incumbent.
Surprisingly, we find that in terms of total welfare, it is better
to allocate the new bandwidth to the monopolist that to create
a new competing service provider.
In Figures 3 and 4, we look at this case in greater detail by
plotting the revenue and the consumer surplus, respectively.
From the figures it follows that creating a new competing
service provider leads to much higher consumer surplus, but
the increase in total revenue of the service provider(s) is much
than when the bandwidth is allocated to the monopolist. Thus,
if consumer surplus is what drives policy, then it is better to
create the new competing service provider.
Finally, we compare the different market scenarios in terms
of the market clearing price when the providers have to
purchase spectrum from another entity (government or pri-
vate). In Figure 5 we plot the market clearing per unit price
from Section IV for two cases when up to two units of
Fig. 2: Total welfare as a function of bandwidth allocated
according to the different schemes for a particular choice of
linear latencies and demand function
Fig. 3: Total welfare as a function of bandwidth allocated
according to the different schemes for a particular choice of
linear latencies and demand function
bandwidth can be allocated: first, the monopoly setting where
the monopolist has an initial endowment of C = 1; and
second, the oligopoly setting where the competing providers
have equal initial endowments of C1 = C2 = 1/2 units and
any initial spectrum is allocated equally. If the amount of
spectrum to allocated is small, then in terms of revenue of
the sale of spectrum, the monopoly setting is better. However,
if maximizing total welfare is the goal, then from the plots
in Figure 1, the oligopolistic setting is better. Thus, it follows
that a social planner (or entity like the government) would
always prefer the oligopoly setting, but a private seller with a
small amount to spectrum to sell would prefer the monopoly
setting.
Fig. 4: Total welfare as a function of bandwidth allocated
according to the different schemes for a particular choice of
linear latencies and demand function
8Fig. 5: Total welfare as a function of bandwidth allocated
according to the different schemes for a particular choice of
linear latencies and demand function
The model we’ve considered ignores many important factors
that could dramatically change the conclusions. First, we
assume that all bandwidth that has been allocated and is
available for allocation is equally good. Given the different
propagation characteristics for different frequencies, such a
simplistic assumption needs to be revisited by allowing for
heterogeneity in latency functions depending on the frequency.
The heterogeneity of the frequency bands also impacts the
provisioning costs (network architecture, number of access
points, number of repeaters, cost of devices, etc.), and so a
more comprehensive model would reflect these differences.
Considering heterogeneity of the providers in terms of latency
functions and market power would also be important. Addi-
tionally, the extraction of utility from a particular frequency
band also depends on the applications using the band. The
2.4GHz and 5GHz bands were not considered commercially
viable before the advent and success of 802.11/WiFi [21],
[28]. A coupling of innovation cycles with the bandwidth
provisioning methods chosen would be desirable to model.
Another related aspect that we do not model in this analysis is
the increase of the customer base with increasing bandwidth
allocation, although by assuming a large enough qmax this
effect can easily be incorporated. For the sake of simplicity
and to facilitate explicit calculations, we restricted the number
of competing providers to two, and considering more than two
would be valuable as well. We have also assumed a homoge-
neous user population. At the very least, it would be useful
to model a heterogeneous population such as in [36]. Finally,
we have not modeled any uncertainty in our analysis, in terms
of knowledge of the population base, demand functions, or
bandwidth availability. In future work, we plan to address these
shortcomings with a more detailed and realistic model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Using the model of competition in congestible resources,
we analyzed the impact of adding additional spectrum under
different market conditions. Specifically, we contrasted mo-
nopolistic, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive spectrum
markets with and without additional unlicensed or whitespace
spectrum. Using the equilibrium analysis of these scenarios,
we then considered a simple model of how the providers
would consider additional investment in spectrum. We then
used this model to propose appropriate per unit valuations in
each scenario.
APPENDIX A
MONOPOLY CASE
For a given price p ≥ 0, the amount of traffic that arrives
qm is given by the solution of
p+ lm(qm/C) = P (qm)
if p ∈ [0, pmax], and otherwise qm ≡ 0. For revenue maximiza-
tion it is clear that p ∈ [0, pmax] so we can assume that p =
P (qm) − lm(qm/C) which is a concave decreasing function
of qm; for later use denote pm(qm) := P (qm) − lm(qm/C).
Note that qm is greatest when p = 0 and this value is given
by qˆm the unique non-negative solution to lm(q/C) = P (q).
The revenue maximization problem is then
max
pm∈[0,pmax]
Rm(p) = qmpm,
which can be rewritten as
max
qm∈[0,qˆm]
Rm(qm) = qm(P (qm)− lm(qm/C))
It is easily verified that the revenue Rm(qm) is a strictly
concave function of qm. Thus, there is a unique maximizer
which can also be shown to be an interior solution. Let
the maximizer be q∗m, then the revenue optimal asking price
p∗m = P (q
∗
m)− lc(q∗m/C). Furthermore, q∗m satisfies
q∗m = −
P (q∗m)− lm
(
q∗m
C
)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
This relationship can now be used to determine the change in
quantity served with change in C. Working through the details
9we get
∂q∗m
∂C
=
(
P (q∗m)− lm
(
q∗m
C
))2 l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C2 +
q∗ml
′′
m
(
q∗m
C
)
C3

β
,
where β := 2
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
2
−
(
P (q∗m)− lm
(
q∗m
C
))P ′′(q∗m)− l′′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C2
 .
It is easy to see that ∂q
∗
m
∂C > 0. Using the characterization of
p∗m we have
∂p∗m(q
∗
m)
∂C
=
∂q∗m
∂C
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ q∗m l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C2
=
(
P (q∗m)− lm
(
q∗m
C
))
q∗m
β
×
P ′(q∗m) l′′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C3
− P ′′(q∗m)
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C2
 .
The sign of ∂pm(q
∗
m)
∂C depends on particular functions involved
and the value of C. However, we note that for linear price and
latency functions, the monopoly price does not depend on C
as the derivative is 0!
The consumer surplus for a given price p ∈ [0, pmax] and
corresponding quantity qm is given by
Sm(qm) =
∫ qm
0
P (q)dq − qmP (qm)
Therefore, the total welfare is given by
Tm(qm) = Sm(qm) +Rm(qm) =
∫ qm
0
P (q)dq − qmlm
(qm
C
)
At the revenue optimal operating point q∗m, these are given
by Rm(q∗m), Sm(q
∗
m) and T (q
∗
m) respectively. The change in
total welfare is given by
∂Tm(qm)
∂C
=
∂q∗m
∂C
P (q∗m)− lm(q∗mC
)
− q∗m
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ q∗m l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C2
= −q∗mP ′(q∗m)
∂q∗m
∂C
+ q∗m
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C2
which is positive. Thus, both the quantity served and total
welfare increase when the capacity C is increased.
APPENDIX B
MONOPOLY WITH INCREMENTAL WHITE-SPACE
Here we consider the addition of an infinitesimal addition
of whitespace when there is a monopolist. Let δW be this
amount of whitespace. Then the user equilibrium condition
implies
p+ lm
(qm
C
)
= lw
( qw
δW
)
= P (qm + qw)
Since we’re adding only a small amount of whitespace and
since all the functions used are continuously differentiable, we
will always be comparing with the monopoly setting. Thus, we
can define the following
p = p∗m + δp, qm = q
∗
m + δqm,
qw
δW
= qˆw + δqw
The reason for the different definition of qw will become clear
very soon. Feeding this into the user equilibrium condition we
(approximately) get
p∗m + lc
(
q∗m
C
)
+ δp+ δqm
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ δ2qm
l′′m
(
q∗m
2C2
)
C
= lw(qˆw) + δqwl
′
w(qˆw) + δ
2qw
l′′w(qˆw)
2
= P (q∗m) + (δqm + qˆwδW )P
′(q∗m) + (δqm + qˆwδW )
2P
′′(q∗m)
2
= P (q∗m) + (δqm + qˆwδW )P
′(q∗m)
+ (δ2qm + 2qˆwδWδqm + qˆ
2
wδ
2W )
P ′′(q∗m)
2
Equating the non-infinitesimal terms and the infinitesimal
terms we get
qˆw = l
−1
w
(
p∗m + lm
(
q∗m
C
))
= l−1w (P (q
∗
m))
δp = δqm
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ qˆwδWP ′(q∗m)
+ δqwδWP
′(q∗m) +
(
δ2qm + 2qˆwδWδqm + qˆ
2
wδ
2W
) P ′′(q∗m)
2
δqwl
′
w(qˆw) + δ
2qw
l′′w(qˆw)
2
= δp+ δqm
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ δ2qm
l′′m
(
q∗m
2C2
)
C
For analytical tractability we will start by assuming that lw(·)
is a linear function so that its second derivative is 0, later on
we will show that the general case can be analyzed in exactly
the same manner. Using this assumption we then get
δqw =
δp+ δqm
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + δ
2qm
l′′m
(
q∗m
2C2
)
C
l′w(qˆw)
≈ δp+ δqm
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
l′w(qˆw)
,
where we ignored the higher order term since δqw gets
multiplied by δW .
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Using the last equation to substituting for δqw in the
expression for δp and ignoring higher order terms, we get
δp ≈
δqm
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C

1− δW P ′(q∗m)l′w(qˆw)
+
qˆwδWP
′(q∗m) + δqmδW
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
1− δW P ′(q∗m)l′w(qˆw)
+
(δ2qm + 2qˆwδWδqm + qˆ
2
wδ
2W )
P ′′(q∗m)
2
1− δW P ′(q∗m)l′w(qˆw)
≈ δqm
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ qˆwδWP ′(q∗m)
+ qˆwδ
2W
(
P ′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
+
P ′′(q∗m)
2
)
+ δqmδW qˆwP
′′(q∗m)
+ δqmδW
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C

+ δqmδW
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
+ δ2qm
P ′′(q∗m)
2
= δqm
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ qˆwδWP ′(q∗m)
+ qˆwδ
2W
(
P ′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
+
P ′′(q∗m)
2
)
+ δqmδW
(
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
P ′(q∗m) + qˆwP
′′(q∗m)
)
+ δ2qm
P ′′(q∗m)
2
The revenue is now given by
Rmw = pqm = (p
∗
m + δp)(q
∗
m + δqm)
= p∗mq
∗
m + δqmp
∗
m + δpq
∗
m + δpδqm
= p∗mq
∗
m + δqm
p∗m + q∗m
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C

+ q∗mqˆwδWP
′(q∗m) + qˆwq
∗
mδ
2W
(
P ′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
+
P ′′(q∗m)
2
)
+ δ2qm
P ′(q∗m)− l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ q∗m
P ′′(q∗m)
2

+ δqmδW
(
P ′(q∗m)
(
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
)
+ q∗mqˆwP
′′(q∗m)
)
,
where we ignore higher order terms. Since p∗m = P (q
∗
m) −
lm
(
q∗m
C
)
, using the characterization of q∗m we can simplify
the expression above to
Rmw = R
∗
m + q
∗
mqˆwδWP
′(q∗m)
+ qˆwq
∗
mδ
2W
(
P ′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
+
P ′′(q∗m)
2
)
+ δ2qc
P ′(q∗m)− l′c
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ q∗m
P ′′(q∗m)
2

+ δqcδW
(
P ′(q∗m)
(
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
)
+ q∗mqˆwP
′′(q∗m)
)
Using the properties of P (·) and lm(·), it is clear that the
revenue is a concave function of δqm; without the concav-
ity assumption on P (·) we need P ′(q∗m) − l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
/C +
q∗m
P ′′(q∗m)
2 < 0 for concavity in δqm. Setting the derivative to
be zero yields
δq∗m = −
1
2
(
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
)
P ′(q∗m) + q
∗
mqˆwP
′′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + q
∗
m
P ′′(q∗m)
2
δW
It is easy to see that δq∗m is negative if qˆw+q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
≥ 0, so
that adding a small amount of whitespace results in reduction
in the traffic served by the monopolist when the revenue
maximization procedure is carried out. Having identified δq∗m,
the infinitesimal change in revenue after ignoring higher order
terms is
δRmw = q
∗
mqˆwδWP
′(q∗m).
It is easy to see that the revenue of the provider decreases with
the addition of whitespace.
The consumer surplus is given by
Smw =
∫ qc+qw
0
P (q)dq − (qc + qw)P (qc + qw)
=
∫ q∗m
0
P (q)dq − q∗mP (q∗m) + (δqc + δW qˆw)P (q∗m)
− (δqc + δW qˆw)(P (q∗m) + q∗mP ′(q∗m))
so that the infinitesimal change in consumer surplus at the
revenue maximization point after ignoring higher order terms
is
δSmw = −(δq∗c + δW qˆw)q∗mP ′(q∗m)
= −δWq∗mP ′(q∗m)
×
−12
(
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
)
P ′(q∗m) + q
∗
mqˆwP
′′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + q
∗
m
P ′′(q∗m)
2
+ qˆw

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Using the two quantities derived above, we get the infinites-
imal change in total welfare to be
δTmw = δR+ δS
= δW
1
2
(
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
)
P ′(q∗m) + q
∗
mqˆwP
′′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′c
(
q∗m
C
)
C + q
∗
m
P ′′(q∗m)
2
q∗mP
′(q∗m)
Again, it is easy to verify that δTmw is negative if qˆw +
q∗m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
≥ 0. Finally, we get
∂Tmw
∂W
∣∣∣
W=0
=
1
2
(
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
)
P ′(q∗m) + q
∗
mqˆwP
′′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + q
∗
m
P ′′(q∗m)
2
q∗mP
′(q∗m)
Note that our analysis also yields the partial derivatives of p,
qc, Rmw and Smw at W = 0.
Further restricting the latency function lm(·) to be linear,
i.e., lm(x) = x, we have using the characterization of the
monopoly setting
q∗mP
′(q∗m) + P (q
∗
m) = 2
q∗m
C
, qˆw = P (q
∗
m).
Using these we have
qˆw + q
∗
m
P ′(q∗m)
l′w(qˆw)
= P (q∗m) + q
∗
mP
′(q∗m) = 2
q∗m
C
∂Tmw
∂W
∣∣∣
W=0
=
1
2
2
P ′(q∗m)
C + P (q
∗
m)P
′′(q∗m)
P ′(q∗m)−
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + q
∗
m
P ′′(q∗m)
2
(
q∗m
)2
P ′(q∗m)
Now it is easy to see that ∂Tmw∂W
∣∣∣
W=0
is negative.
In the general nonlinear whitespace latency case, δqw is
obtained by solving the following quadratic equation,
δqwl
′
w(qˆw) + δ
2qw
l′′w(qˆw)
2
= δp+ δqc
l′c
(
q∗m
C
)
C
+ δ2qc
l′′c
(
q∗m
2C2
)
C
The only viable solution is given by
δqw =
−l′w(qˆw)
l′′w(qˆw)
+√√√√√(l′w(qˆw))2 + 2l′′w(qˆw)
δp+ δqm l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + δ
2qm
l′′m
(
q∗m
2C2
)
C

l′′w(qˆw)
≈ δp+ δqm
l′c
(
q∗m
C
)
C + δ
2qm
l′′m
(
q∗m
2C2
)
C
l′w(qˆw)
−
l′′w(qˆw)
δp+ δqm l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C + δ
2qm
l′′m
(
q∗m
2C2
)
C
2
(l′w(qˆw))
3
Since δqw gets multiplied by δW and since we don’t need
to account for higher than second order terms, it suffices to
approximate δqw as
δqw ≈
δp+ δqm
l′m
(
q∗m
C
)
C
l′w(qˆw)
,
which is exactly the form that we derived when lw(·) was
assumed to be linear so that the same result holds.
APPENDIX C
COMPETING PROVIDERS
Let the capacities of the two providers be C1 and C2,
respectively. We assume that they charge prices p1 and p2
and get quantities q1 and q2, respectively. It is easy to argue
that neither provider will charge a price so high that all the
customers go with the other. Thus, we can restrict attention
to the case where q1, q2 > 0. In such scenario, the user
equilibrium is given by
p1 +
q1
C1
= p2 +
q2
C2
= P (q1 + q2)
In the analysis we will ignore some of the edge cases but
justify from the final solution as to why they are not necessary
to consider. For i ∈ {1, 2}, denote be −i the set {1, 2} \ {i}.
From the user equilibrium, we find that the prices for i = 1, 2
are given by
pi = pmax(1− q−i)− qi
(
pmax +
1
Ci
)
.
Given (q1, q2), the prices are determined so we analyze the
strategy of the providers by considering (q1, q2) instead;
ensuring non-negativity of prices and other such considerations
are what we will ignore for the moment. The revenue of the
providers for i = 1, 2 is then given by
Ri(qi, q−i) = pmax(1− q−i)qi − q2i
(
pmax +
1
Ci
)
Note that provider i ∈ {1, 2} maximizes her revenue by
choosing qi given the value of q−i. The best response of each
provider i = 1, 2 is then given by
qˆi(q−i) =
pmax
2
1− q−i
pmax +
1
Ci
The unique fixed point of the above two equations for i = 1, 2
is given by
q∗i =
p2max + 2
pmax
C−i
3p2max + 4pmax
(
1
C1
+ 1C2
)
+ 4C1C2
The corresponding prices for i = 1, 2 are
p∗i = pmax
p2max +
pmax
Ci
+ 2pmaxC−i +
2
C1C2
3p2max + 4pmax
(
1
C1
+ 1C2
)
+ 4C1C2
It is easy to verify that (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Additionally note that p∗i < pmax/2 = p
∗
m for i = 1, 2, i.e., the
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asking price is strictly lower than the monopoly price which
is a consequence of competition.
As mentioned earlier, the figures of merit are now given by
R1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = p
∗
1q
∗
1 , R2(p
∗
2, p
∗
1) = p
∗
2q
∗
2 ,
So(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) =
pmax
2
(q∗1 + q
∗
2)
2,
To(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = R1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) +R2(p
∗
2, p
∗
1) + S(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
We do not give the expressions as they’re quite unwieldy.
APPENDIX D
COMPETING PROVIDERS WITH WHITE-SPACE
Now we consider the addition of W units of whitespace.
As before, let qw be the quantity served in the whitespace.
Again, at the user equilibrium (assuming non-zero quantities)
we have
p1 +
q1
C1
= p2 +
q2
C2
=
qw
W
= P (q1 + q2 + qw)
Using these equations we have
∀i = 1, 2 pi = pmax(1− qw − q−i)− qi
(
pmax +
1
Ci
)
,
qw =
1− q1 − q2
1 + 1Wpmax
Substituting for qw in the expressions for the prices and
simplifying the expressions we get for i = 1, 2
pi =
pmax
1 +Wpmax
(1− q−1)− qi
(
Wpmax
1 +Wpmax
+ pmax +
1
Ci
)
Now the revenue of the providers for i = 1, 2 is given by
Ri(qi, q−i) =
pmax
1 +Wpmax
(1− q−i)qi
− q2i
(
Wpmax
1 +Wpmax
+ pmax +
1
Ci
)
The best response of each provider i = 1, 2 is given by
qˆi(q−i) =
pmax
2
1− q−i
Wpmax +
(
pmax +
1
Ci
)
(1 +Wpmax)
Define the following
D := 4pmax
2∑
i=1
1
Ci
+ 4Wp2max
(
2 + 2pmax +
2∑
i=1
1
Ci
)
+ 3p2max + 4
2∏
i=1
(
1
Ci
+Wpmax
(
1 + pmax +
1
Ci
))
.
Then the unique fixed point for i = 1, 2 is given by
q∗i =
2pmaxC−i + p
2
max + 2Wp
2
max
(
1 + pmax +
1
C−i
)
D
Using these expressions we get the following
q∗w =
Wpmax
1 +Wpmax
×
∏2
i=1
(
pmax +
2
Ci
+ 2Wpmax
(
1 + pmax +
1
Ci
))
D
∀i = 1, 2 p
∗
i
pmax
=(
2Wpmax +Wp
2
max + (1 +Wpmax)
(
pmax +
1
Ci
))
(1 +Wpmax)
×
(
2Wpmax +Wp
2
max + (1 +Wpmax)
(
pmax +
2
C−i
))
D
It is easy to show that (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. The
figures of merit are then given by
R1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) = p
∗
1q
∗
1 , R2(q
∗
2 , q
∗
1) = p
∗
2q
∗
2 ,
Sow(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) =
pmax
2
(q∗1 + q
∗
2 + q
∗
w)
2,
Tow(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) = R1(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) +R2(q
∗
2 , q
∗
1) + S(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2)
APPENDIX E
PERFECT COMPETITION
Under the perfect competition (or no market power) assump-
tion, the revenue maximization problem is a convex problem
with the unique maximizer given by qc(x) such that
λ = lc
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
+
qc(x)
C(x)
l′c
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
Comparing with the expression, this implies that the optimal
price is given by
p(x) =
qc(x)
C(x)
l′c
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
Additionally, it also follows that qc(x)C(x) ≡ α¯, i.e., independent
of x, since αl′c(α)+ lc(α) is an increasing function of α. Now
α¯ is given by the unique solution in [0, 1/C] of
P (αC) = lc(α) + αl
′
c(α)
It is easily discerned that α¯ ∈ (0, 1/C). The price is given by
p(x) ≡ α¯l′c(α¯).
The total revenue of all the providers is given by
Rc =
∫ x
0
Rc(x)dx = α¯
2l′c(α¯)C
The consumer surplus is given by
Sc =
∫ ∫ 1
0
qc(x)dx
0
P (q)dq − P
(∫ 1
0
qc(x)dx
)∫ 1
0
qc(x)dx
=
∫ α¯C
0
P (q)dq − α¯P (α¯C)C
=
∫ α¯C
0
P (q)dq − α¯lc(α¯)C − α¯2l′c(α¯)C
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Knowing these two, the total welfare is
Tc = Rc + Sc =
∫ α¯C
0
P (q)dq − α¯lc(α¯)C
The partial derivative of α¯ in C is given by
∂α¯
∂C
=
α¯P ′(α¯C)
2l′c(α¯) + α¯l′′c (α¯)− CP ′(α¯C)
which is negative. From this the partial derivative of∫ 1
0
qc(x)dx = α¯C is given by
∂
∫ 1
0
qc(x)dx
∂C
= C
∂α¯
∂C
+ α¯
= α¯
2l′c(α¯) + α¯l
′′
c (α¯)
2l′c(α¯) + α¯l′′c (α¯)− CP ′(α¯C)
which is positive. Using all of this we have
∂Tc
∂C
=
(
C
∂α¯
∂C
+ α¯
)
P (α¯C)− α¯lc(α¯)− C ∂α¯
∂C
(α¯l′c(α¯) + lc(α¯))
= C
∂α¯
∂C
(P (α¯C)− α¯l′c(α¯)− lc(α¯)) + α¯(P (α¯C)− lc(α¯))
= α¯2l′c(α¯)
Finally, we will show that the particular equilibrium that we
consider maximizes total welfare so that we get an efficient
allocation. The total revenue, consumer surplus and total
welfare for a valid traffic profile qc(x) (equivalent to asking
price p(x) when no provider demands an excessive price) are
given by
Rc =
∫ 1
0
p(x)qc(x)dx
= P
(∫ 1
0
qc(u)du
)(∫ 1
0
qc(u)du
)
−
∫ 1
0
qc(x)lc
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
dx
Sc =
∫ ∫ 1
0
qc(u)du
0
P (q)dq − P
(∫ 1
0
qc(u)du
)(∫ 1
0
qc(u)du
)
Tc =
∫ ∫ 1
0
qc(u)du
0
P (q)dq −
∫ 1
0
qc(x)lc
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
dx
Since P (q) is an decreasing function of q and αl′c(α) + lc(α)
is an increasing function of α, it is easily verified that the total
welfare T is a concave functional of the traffic profile qc(·).
The Frechet differential of T in direction h(·) at qc(·) is
δTc(qc;h) = P
(∫ 1
0
qc(x)dx
)∫ 1
0
h(x)dx−∫ 1
0
(
lc
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
+
qc(x)
C(x)
l′c
(
qc(x)
C(x)
))
h(x)dx.
The constraints on qc(·) are
∫ 1
0
qc(x)dx ∈ [0, qmax], where,
without loss of generality, we assume qmax = 1, and qc(x) >
0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that this is a convex constraint.
Therefore, using [23, Theorem 2, Chapter 7], we find that the
choice of qc(x) = α¯C(x) (an interior point of the constraint
set) also maximizes the total welfare as the Frechet differential
is 0 in all feasible directions, i.e., it is the efficient allocation
as well.
APPENDIX F
PERFECT COMPETITION WITH WHITESPACE
We now generalize the perfect competition model by adding
W bandwidth as whitespace. The user equilibrium now be-
comes
λ = P
(
qw +
∫ 1
0
qc(y)dy
)
= lw
(qw
W
)
= p(x) + lc
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
∀x ∈ [0, 1]
Using the same logic as before, the revenue maximizing price
p(x) = qc(x)C(x) l
′
c
(
qc(x)
C(x)
)
and qc(x)C(x) ≡ αw where αw and user
demand in white-space q∗w satisfy
lw
(
q∗w
W
)
= P (q∗w + αwC) = αwl
′
c(αw) + lc(αw)
Solving for q∗w in terms of αw we get
q∗w = D
(
αl′c(α) + lc(α)
)− αC
Using this to eliminate q∗w, αw must solve
lw
(
D
(
αl′c(α) + lc(α)
)− αC
W
)
= αl′c(α) + lc(α)
It is easy to see that the LHS is a decreasing function of α
and the RHS is an increasing function of α such that they
cross each other in [0, α¯]. This implies that there is a unique
solution αw ∈ (0, α¯).
The total revenue of the providers, consumer surplus and
total welfare are given by
Rcw = α
2
wl
′
w(αw)C
Scw =
∫ αwC+q∗w
0
P (q)dq − (αwl′c(αw) + lc(αw))(αwC + q∗w)
Tcw =
∫ αwC+q∗w
0
P (q)dq − (αwl′c(αw) + lc(αw))q∗w
− lc(αw)αwC
APPENDIX G
JUSTIFICATION OF PERFECT COMPETITION MODEL
We will mathematically justify the perfect competition
model as a limiting case of many providers. For this we will
restrict attention to the symmetric case and consider a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium. Assume that there are n providers
each with capacity C/n. Let provider i ∈ {1, . . . , n} demand
price pi and get a share qc(i) of the traffic. We will assume,
without loss of generality, that no provider asks a price so
high that no traffic gets routed to it. Then the user equilibrium
condition is
P
 n∑
j=1
qc(j)
 = pi + lc(qc(i)n
C
)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
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From this we have
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} pi = P
 n∑
j=1
qc(j)
− lc(qc(i)n
C
)
so that we can equivalently consider the traffic served for the
Nash equilibria.
Since we will be interested in symmetric equilibria, without
loss of generality consider provider 1. The best response of
provider 1 to actions of the other providers is to choose qc(1)
to maximize its revenue R(1) which is given by
R(1) = qc(1)
P
qc(1) + n∑
j=2
qc(j)
− lc(qc(1)n
C
)
It is easy to verify that the objective is concave in qc(1). The
partial derivative of the revenue in qc(1) is given by
∂R(1)
∂qc(1)
=
P
qc(1) + n∑
j=2
qc(j)
+ qc(1)P ′
qc(1) + n∑
j=2
qc(j)

− qc(1)n
C
l′c
(
qc(1)n
C
)
− lc
(
qc(1)n
C
)
If
∑n
j=2 qc(j) < 1, then there exists a unique solution in(
0, 1−∑nj=2 qc(j)). Therefore, the unique symmetric equi-
librium qnc solves
P (nqc) + qcP
′ (nqc) =
qcn
C
l′c
(qcn
C
)
+ lc
(qcn
C
)
with nqnc ∈ (0, 1).
Now we will consider the limiting behavior of n increasing
without bound. Since nqnc is bounded, along subsequences we
have a limit. Let {nk}∞k=1 be one such subsequence and let
qkc be the limiting value of nkq
nk
c . Then limk→∞ q
nk
c = 0,
qkc ∈ [0, 1] and qkc satisfies
P (qc) =
qc
C
l′c
(qc
C
)
+ lc
(qc
C
)
It can be verified that the equation above has exactly one
solution in (0, 1), say q∗c . Therefore, limn→∞ nq
n
c = q
∗
c . Note
that q∗c is exactly what results from our perfect competition
analysis, see (10).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA
Without loss of generality consider provider 1. Note the
following:
q∗1 =
p2max + 2
pmax
C2
3p2max + 4
pmax
C2
C1
(
3p2max + 4
pmax
C2
)
C1
(
3p2max + 4
pmax
C2
)
+ 4pmax +
4
C2
p∗1 = pmax
p2max + 2
pmax
C2
3p2max + 4
pmax
C2
×
C1
(
3p2max + 4
pmax
C2
)
+ 4pmax +
4
C2
− pmax
C1
(
3p2max + 4
pmax
C2
)
+ 4pmax +
4
C2
We are interested in the properties of R1(p∗1, p
∗
2) = p
∗
1q
∗
1 as a
function of C1. From the above, we find that
R1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) ∝
aC1
aC1 + b
aC1 + bd
aC1 + b
= 1− b(2− d)
aC1 + b
+
b2(1− d)
(aC1 + b)
2 ,
where
a = 3p2max + 4
pmax
C2
> 0
b = 4pmax +
4
C2
> 0,
and d ∈ (3/4, 1] (limits obtained by varying C2). Thus, the
first and second partial derivative of R1 in C1 are given by
∂R1
∂C1
∝ (2− d)aC1 + bd
∂2R1
∂C21
∝ −
(
b(2d− 1) + a(2− d)C1
)
,
with the constant of proportionality for the first derivative
given by
pmax
(
pmax +
2
C2
3pmax +
4
C2
)2
ab
(aC1 + b)
3 .
Since d ∈ (3/4, 1], it follows that the second derivative of R1
is negative proving that R1 is a strictly concave function of
C1.
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